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Deliberative Oratory in the Darkest Hour: Style 
Analysis of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Statement at the 
Security Council 
By Syeda Sara Abbas 
In 1971 Pakistan suffered a near death experience: genocide, civil war, 
migration and territorial reconfiguration.  Central to understanding this experience 
is the statement of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (henceforth Bhutto) at the United Nations 
Security Council on December 15, 1971. This statement not only embodied the 
Pakistani reaction and explained the national viewpoint, but it brought forth the 
major complexities of and the participants in the conflict.1 Pakistan’s viewpoint  
termed the war as an Indian-Russian conspiracy and not a local movement and 
Bhutto’s statement reflected this binary view. The participants were either 
aggressors: India and Russia or they were allies, China and U.S. Bhutto viewed 
France and Britain as aggressors as they had abstained from taking sides.  As he 
tore his papers on the floor of the Security Council, Bhutto showed a deep 
contempt for the Indian-Russian alliance that had facilitated this disaster. 
Writers have stated Pakistan was a country without a viable government, 
money, international policy or a constitution when the war reached the United 
Nations on December 4, 1971 (La Porte 105; Raza 122). Several draft resolutions 
were presented before the Security Council that were either suspended, rejected, 
vetoed or delayed for deliberation. Because of the unanimity among the members 
the question was referred to the General Assembly, where Pakistan scored its only 
diplomatic triumph with the “Uniting for Peace” resolution which recommended a 
ceasefire. This war was intricate in nature as it involved gross human rights 
violations and also a territorial conflict between two long- standing enemies.  East 
Pakistan was not a colonial territory nor a separate nation. However the violations 
of murder, rape and arson were severe enough to deem it an international crisis. 
Sydney Schanberg, an eye witness and reporter termed it a pogrom and reported 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The author would like to thank Claudia Carlos, Assistant Professor in Rhetoric, Department of English, 
Carnegie Mellon University for reviewing an earlier version of this paper. 
25
Syeda Sara Abbas 	  
	  
one million killed and 400,000 raped (qted in Tharoor). Because of war crimes the 
issue came back to the Council. The movement between the two forums the 
General Assembly and the Security Council revealed a dismal understanding and 
weak handling of the war on Pakistan’s side. Pakistani generals drew analogies 
between 1965 and 1971 and expected the war would end inconclusively as in 
1965. They neglected diplomatic channels until the last week. Rafi Raza who 
accompanied  Bhutto to the Security Council claims that they came too late. 
Bhutto arrived at the Council on December 10, when the Pakistan Army began 
suffering reversals and the Soviet Union began to appeal for a hearing for the 
Bangladeshi representatives (Raza 118). He expressed the Pakistani viewpoint in 
statements delivered on December 13 and 14. He appealed to the Council to 
condemn Indian aggression and order a ceasefire. US and China, Pakistan’s allies, 
did little to help Pakistan diplomatically. Meanwhile back in the Security Council, 
the members proposed new resolutions that revealed Pakistan’s deteriorating 
position. The three new draft resolutions, the Polish, the Russian and the Anglo-
French recommended a ceasefire with troop withdrawal and power handed over to 
East Pakistanis. Pakistan’s choices were grim: it could accept any resolutions or 
wait for the army to surrender. Finally on the December 15, Bhutto requested the 
president of Security Council to convene a session where, in the words of Khalid 
Hasan, he “made the most emotional, though well-prepared, speech of his career.” 
The fall of Dhaka the next day put an end to all the deliberation. 
The focus of this paper is a style analysis of the statement delivered by 
Bhutto at the United Nations Security Council on December 15, 1971. The 
statement has three versions: a brief version as reported in The New York Times 
and on YouTube videos. The second version called “My Country Beckons Me” 
appears in Sani Panhwar’s website, www.bhutto.org which is a useful database on 
Bhutto.The last and more virulent version appears in the government publication, 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Speeches in the Security Council September 22 1965, 
December 1971. This statement has been derived from the last version, the 
government publication because it is the only published version which appeared 
during Bhutto’s rule in 1972 and can be deemed as authentic.2Bhutto’s personal 	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  Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Speeches in the United Nations Security Council 
September, 22 1965 and December, 1971. Karachi: 1975. Department of Films 
and Publication. 43-47 	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style, flamboyant and binary, is revealed in his writings. Rhetoricians, Edward  P. 
J.Corbett and Robert J. Connors say that style is difficult to describe as it involves 
language, diction  and structure (21). I understand a style analysis as the study of 
artful expression of ideas. It looks at structural features such as, sentence length, 
number of words and number of paragraphs. 
 
 It also looks at diction, figures of speech and the construction of statement or 
speech. Holistically a style analysis looks at audience, purpose and message and 
analyses how a speaker creates and maintains ethos. The style analysis will help 
to answer the research question: Why did Bhutto, a renowned diplomat, use such 
“undiplomatic” language in the statement? Why did he tear up his papers?  Here 
is a excerpt from the statement that shows Bhutto’s undiplomatic language:  
The Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union talked about 
realities. Mr. Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union, look 
at this reality. I know that you are the representative of a great 
country. You behave like one. The way you throw out your chest, 
the way you thump the table. You do not talk like Comrade Malik; 
you talk like Tsar Malik. (Bhutto 45) 
 I argue that Bhutto’s statement at the UN is a clash of two discourses: the 
scholarly and theatrical as he was trying to communicate with “two” distinct 
audiences simultaneously, the international community and the Pakistani nation. 
As a diplomat he appealed to the western audience and the international 
community to order a ceasefire so a small country with varied ethnic groups could 
defend itself. He used scholarly themes laced with rhetorical wordplay for this 
audience. This was a logical appeal that reached out to smaller countries with 
heterogeneous populations in the post- colonial era. As a political figure he tried 
to mentally prepare his voters for the reality of dismemberment and military 
defeat so they would absolve him of blame. He used theatrical, hyperbolic themes 
to connect to Pakistani audience. Withstanding his complex personality that 
points to “feudal ethos and megalomania” Bhutto may have wished to portray 
himself as an emotional leader as he understood the nuances of Pakistani culture 
(Gilani 217). Even in normal times, Pakistan’s patrimonial culture requires a 
feudal ethos and theatrical discourse. In such epic wartimes such discourse would 
be further exaggerated. Pakistan had been dramatically beaten (Ziring 582). At the 
eve of the fall of Dhaka, Pakistanis would not have responded to a reasonable, 
responsible, cautious statement. Bhutto created his statement and ethos keeping in 
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mind the emotional needs of his Pakistan audience. The following statement 
excerpt shows extreme theatrical discourse:  
For four days we have been deliberating here. For four days the 
Security Council has procrastinated. Why? Because the object was 
for Dacca to fall. That was the object. It was quite clear to me from 
the beginning. All right, so what if Dacca falls?... So what if Dacca 
falls? So what if the whole of East Pakistan falls? So what if the 
whole of West Pakistan falls? So what if our state is obliterated? 
We will build a new Pakistan. We will build a better Pakistan. We 
will build a greater Pakistan… (Bhutto 40-44) 
The excerpt begins in active voice, “For four days we have been deliberating 
here…”  but then moves to the passive voice, “…the object was for Dacca to fall.” 
The sudden shift from the active to the passive hides the doer or the subject. The 
subject changes from “we” to the “Security Council” in the next sentence. The 
subject “Security Council” is carried forward in the next sentence, “the object was 
for..” which is in passive voice. The implied argument is that the Council let Dhaka 
fall and in this way destroyed Pakistan. The hyperbolic statements “so what if 
Dhaka falls”, “so what if East Pakistan falls” have a complex rhetorical effect 
because they are based on actual events and are simultaneously an exaggeration and 
a fact. Bhutto may have felt safe in indulging in hyperbole as territorially and 
diplomatically there was little to lose. Hyperbole elicits strong responses from 
readers, and these statements would have piqued Pakistani readers/ listeners. This 
hyperbole creates a rationalization that Pakistan was destroyed by the U.N. The 
next hyperbolic statement, “We will build a greater Pakistan” circumvents the main 
issues behind the war and creates a simplified solution to the problem. This brief 
style analysis is representative of the whole paper. The paper will analyze the 
Bhutto’s statement keeping in mind diplomatic discourse and deliberative oratory.  
1. Diplomatic Discourse  
 Christer Jonsson and Martin Hall expand the understanding of diplomatic 
communications from “regulated process of communications” or “communication 
system of an international society” to include symbolic gestures (196). They argue 
that verbal communication, nonverbal symbols and public and private realms are 
important repertoire for diplomacy. Expanding on this definition, I posit that 
diplomatic discourse is the oral, written and visual communication by way of 
speech, gestures, documentation and body language between diplomats, members 
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of supranational organizations, global institutions and international groups. Minor 
gestures as handshakes, facial expressions, stance, tone of voice are thus an 
important part of diplomatic discourse along with tone, register and language. 
Diplomatic discourse is highly stylized, adaptive and strategic and depends on the 
speaker, culture, conflict and era. This conflict came during the Cold War era, 
where the U.N. worked as a court of appeal.  Regional alliances as CENTO, 
SEATO very much reflected the global hedgemony of the two superpowers. 
Regional powers, digital media and multinationals were yet to evolve and so 
diplomatic activity at the UN took an enhanced hue and shaped a country’s image. 
Ray T. Donahue and Michael H. Prosser describe the United Nations as “the 
world’s debating society” where countries and regions argue their viewpoints 
before an august, global audience (221). Condemnation by the UN of any country 
is diplomatically embarrassing and countries strive to avoid making statements that 
can bind them. Speechmaking is a social situation and countries display their 
diplomatic position by the rank of their officials (Donahue and Prosser 124). 
Pakistan sent its deputy prime minister, a higher-ranking official than India, who 
sent its foreign minister. This demonstrated the importance the country attached to 
the conflict. The aim of diplomatic discourse is to promote national values, and 
language is a tool in peace-building because it is used to create and sustain 
alliances. Francisco Gomes de Matos recommends that diplomats, “learn to identify 
and to avoid potentially aggressive, insensitive, offensive, destructive uses of 
languages” (283). Thus diplomats are trained to project a positive, restrained, 
serene and rational demeanor while undertaking negotiations on behalf of their 
country. Speeches at the United Nations can take two main forms: addresses and 
statements. Addresses are more formal and are given at regular sessions of the 
General Assembly and Security Council and reflect “a vision for the 
future”(Donahue and Prosser 223). Statements come at times of crisis during 
special or emergency sessions at the United Nations and reflect a country’s point of 
view. The Security Council acts a court of appeal between nations by calling on 
members to stop aggression and withdraw forces. Since statements usually seek to 
“move an audience towards belief, policy or action” they are part of deliberative 
oratory (Donahue and Prosser 218). 
Bhutto’s speech was a statement. It borrowed from the genre of diplomatic 
discourse by firstly being strategic, secondly by pushing national aims and lastly 
by using scholarly themes. Scholarly themes are necessary in diplomatic 
discourse to sway members. These themes are also strategic as they aim for global 
harmony, national interest and help countries define policies towards an issue. 
Bhutto used strategy effectively when he reminded smaller countries with 
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heterogeneous populations that inaction by the United Nation could set a 
dangerous precedent for their own region. He argued that any country could suffer 
from secessionist elements and would resort to military force to put down rebels. 
The UN had to respect the territorial integrity of smaller countries. He argued that 
smaller countries had to survive in a bipolar world by aligning themselves with 
the two superpowers; this alignment upset the global balance of power. Bhutto's 
appeals to nationalistic aims sought to generate general diplomatic support, as he 
depicted India and Russia as warlike nations, denounced colonial powers for their 
inaction, and ironically praised China and America for their (nonexistent) support. 
Lastly the statement carried several scholarly themes with global ramifications: 
moral ideals, quotes from statesmen such as Jefferson and Wilson, global values 
such as eradication of poverty and global peace.  
The statement broke several conventions of diplomatic discourse as it was 
simultaneously rude, belligerent and extremely personal. Bhutto’s language was 
belligerent on occasion and his tone and body language were accusatory 
throughout. He used elaborate hand gestures when talking of “legalization of 
aggression”(Bhutto 39). Youtube videos from unspecified sources show him 
sitting back in his chair and turning around to look at everyone in the Council. He 
tapped his pen several times and did not refer to notes. He paused as he said, “We 
might have been a party to some settlement” and let his words sink in. His voice 
cracked with emotion and he waved his hands as he said, “…we will go back and 
fight.” In the video footage, he ended the statement, tore up his papers and walked 
out the hall with the Pakistani delegation in tow. These symbolic gestures showed 
his utter disregard dissatisfaction with the proceedings. Even on paper Bhutto’s 
rudeness is significant. He called the Russian representative “a Tsar” (Bhutto 45) 
and compared the Indian foreign minister to “a janitor”: 
 Mr. President, you referred to the "distinguished" Foreign 
Minister of India. If he can be Foreign Minister of India, I could 
have been Prime Minister of united India. But I would rather be a 
janitor in a free country. (Bhutto 41) 
Bhutto spoke in “a voice choking with emotion” (Tanner), and talked about 
himself excessively during the statement: 
My people must know. I have not come here to accept abject 
surrender. If the Security Council wants me to be a party to the 
legalization of abject surrender, then I say that under no 
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circumstances shall I be. Yesterday my 11-year- old son telephoned 
me from Karachi and said to me, "Do not come back with a document 
of surrender. We do not want to see you back in Pakistan if you come 
like that." I will not take back a document of surrender from the 
Security Council. I will not be a party to the legalization of 
aggression. (Bhutto 39)  (Emphasis added) 
Excessive personal references are undesirable in diplomatic discourse as the 
country is more important that the diplomat. The speaker’s aim is to find support 
for his country’s cause while keeping himself in the background.  
 
Deliberative Oratory  
This statement was basically persuasive in nature and is an example of 
deliberative oratory. Corbett and Connors say deliberative oratory is concerned 
with comparing the worthy with the unworthy and seeks to persuade the audience 
to pursue a certain viewpoint (271). It is concerned with the expedient, which can 
be understood as an imperfection marked by a time constraint. The speaker not 
only wants to persuade his audience, he or she may also want to persuade them 
within a brief span of time. Since deliberative oratory is marked by time-
constraints, it uses by- words for stress and to provoke a sense of urgency. These 
key words are repeated at different times of the discourse for emphasis and 
repetition. Because deliberative oratory is persuasive in nature, the speaker must 
have “strong insight into the topic and the audience” (Corbett and Connors 271). 
The audience has to be won over by depicting the outcome if a course of action is 
not pursued. Thus comparisons, metaphors and analogies with morals, famous 
individuals and historical events are common in deliberative oratory.  
  Bhutto’s statement borrowed two conventions from deliberative oratory. 
First, he used extensive historical analogies. He compared the war to previous 
wars over disputed territories such as Cypress and Jerusalem. Bhutto also used all 
rhetorical means to compare Indian aggression to “Hitlerite aggression” (Bhutto 
44) and “gunboat diplomacy” (Bhutto 44) implying the military might of the two 
countries was unbalanced and the world was allowing a larger country with 
military might to over run a weaker country. In this way he appealed to self-
interested smaller countries that feared the territorial ambitions of their stronger 
neighbors. He painted a picture of a dysfunctional, bipolar world without 
31
Syeda Sara Abbas 	  
	  
international law and precepts where smaller countries were forced to give up 
territory to larger countries and become “harlots of the world”: 
You will be turning the medium-sized and the small countries into 
the harlots of the world. You cannot do that. It is against civilized 
concepts, it is against all the rules of civilization and of 
international morality and justice. (Bhutto 45). 
Secondly he used repetition. Repetition of by-words is necessary for stress and to 
provoke a sense of urgency in deliberative discourse. Bhutto’s by-words referred 
to the ideals of international community: justice (16 times), free or free country (8 
times), foreign occupation (5 times), world peace (4 times), truth (7 times). He 
repeated Pakistan (53 times) to emphasize his country’s predicament in dwindling 
time. Time is a precious commodity in wartime and affects the rhetorical 
situation. Time had run out for Pakistan as Indian troops were outside Dacca and 
the Pakistani generals had already asked for a surrender (Tanner). The Russian 
representatives were pressing for a hearing for the Bangladeshi representatives at 
the UN. Bhutto had merely hours to present his viewpoint, to extricate Pakistan’s 
honor and to survive this political disaster (Taseer 129). He invoked a sense of 
time by referring to the death toll in the war, a reference to loss of life that also 
formed an ethical appeal. Bhutto’s demeanor in the 1971 statement was therefore 
complicated. It was emotional and theatrical as it was a response to the 
complicated rhetorical conditions and it was scholarly as it was addressed to an 
august, law-making body. The statement sought to satisfy the demands of the 
genre of deliberative oratory even though it defied some of conventions of 
diplomatic discourse. 
Bhutto and his Discourse 
Bhutto (1928-1979) is known for his personal magnetism, Oxford diction 
and what Hafeez Malik says is an “acute sensitivity to the concept of balance of 
power” (205). It is difficult to categorize Bhutto’s discourse because he served in 
several roles: academician, diplomat, feudal, politician and ruler.  Anwar Hussain 
Syed describes Bhutto as a mass leader and an intellectual and writes that Bhutto 
like other populist leaders, such as Nasser, Sukarno and Ghaddafi, ruled through a 
combination of charisma, autocracy, nationalistic rhetoric and alignment to world 
order (13). Bhutto used highly stylized language to become Pakistan’s second 
organic, charismatic, nationalist leader; and by 1971, the 43-year old was a 
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political maverick and well-known internationally for his flamboyance and 
oratorical flair.  
Bhutto’s evolving discourse at the United Nations 
  Bhutto’s discourse in the United Nations began as a guarded, traditional 
deliberation, wary of global hierarchy, heedful of the limitations faced by smaller 
countries, and embellished with Latin phrases. His style was narrative and 
gradual, his arguments were based on logos. He mentioned international precepts 
and laws, theories of statecraft and related these to international predicaments. He 
repeated themes of peace and friendship. He was a typical diplomat: pedantic, 
restrained and formal. This quote illustrates formality and is a sample of his early 
speech where he addressed the General Assembly in 1957. Notice the use of Latin 
phrase and the pedantic style towards the end:   
  Before entering into the substance of the issue, please allow me, 
Mr. Chairman, Sir, to conclude, so to speak, my obiter dictal by 
saying that the most salutary aspect of this discussion is that the 
“End” or “Objective” of all gathered here is identical. That end is, 
if I may be permitted to take a slight liberty with the wording of 
the preamble, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
aggression. All are sedulously seeking to find lasting guarantees 
for the insurance of perpetual peace.  (Bhutto speeches 1948-
1965) 
The pedanticism showed a careful and in-depth understanding of the global 
community which had common aims. However metadiscourse in the excerpt, 
“Before entering into the substance of the issue, please allow me, Mr. Chairman, 
Sir,…” is representative of seminal work. Because metadiscourse is wordy it 
shows indirection and formality in a statement before the speaker moves to the 
main topic. New speakers unsure of audience response use more formality and 
metadiscourse than experienced speakers. The use of Latin phrases shows his 
command over the language which was a probably a third language for him. This 
showcased his brilliance, his learning and his time at Oxford, the world’s premier 
institution. He sounded like a textbook as he was learning the discourse and 
mannerism of an institution and may have felt this imitative style would show his 
“place” in the institution. Bhutto ‘s age, 28 years, may have appeared as an 
impediment so he may have adopted this formal style so seasoned diplomats 
would consider him seriously. Later his discourse became natural but it was very 
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much the discourse of a diplomat from a small country. It was rare for a 
representative from a small country, like Pakistan to display effrontery against the 
cultural norms of the Security Council. Defying the social norms meant defying 
the power differential of the world order. A June 1964 speech to the UN similarly 
shows the formal, pedantic style while providing an intellectual argument on self-
regulation: 
We have studied the United Nations Charter and we know its 
limitations. The United Nations is not a super state nor a supreme 
court. It does not issue edicts or writs, which are necessarily 
complied with. The Charter has its limitations and we know the 
pitfalls in taking such problems to the United Nations. In the final 
analysis, these problems have to be faced and overcome by us, the 
people of Pakistan (Bhutto speeches 1948-1965)  
The reference to documents and laws (charter, edicts, writs) again show a 
pedantic style. The formal style is enhanced by metadiscursive phrases, 
“necessarily complied with”, “in the final analysis” which draw attention to the 
writer. The initial use of the “we” pronoun is interesting as it is ambiguous and 
Bhutto could have meant himself, Pakistan or the developing world here. 
Ambiguity is desirable as it allows speakers to shift positions. Furthermore the 
explanatory statements,”It does not issue…” are ambiguous as they are exclusive 
in nature. They exclude the working of the UN and focus on its limitations, rather 
on what the UN does not do which in turn creates an argument for self –regulation 
that countries should resolve their own problems. Bhutto’s pedantic style changed 
significantly with the ‘65 war and his statements were often laced with hyperbole 
and irony. In ’65 Pakistan took the Kashmir issue to the Council and saw a 
stalemate. Bhutto’s changing style showed pessimism with the UN. Kashmir the 
center of Bhutto’s hawkish agenda, piqued his belligerent stance. For instance, in 
a 1965 visit to the UN, he talked about avoiding war for economic well-being. 
However he chose to include confrontational language among his usual scholarly, 
humane arguments. After declaring he wanted peace, Bhutto called India “a great 
monster” and threatened “a thousand year war.” His infamous statement, “Indian 
dogs are going home…” in the Security Council also came during this session and 
was reportedly expunged from record (Taseer 60). These contradictory statements 
which simultaneously praise and declaim were clearly emotional nuance in 
communicating purpose: 
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We are a small country and as I said, our resources are limited—
one has only to look at a map of the world and a map of the sub-
continent to see that we are not interested in war. We do not want 
aggression—we do not want conflict. We want peace in order that 
our people can develop...We should like to see all our energies 
and all our efforts directed towards economic well-being… We 
are facing a great monster and a great aggressor. We shall wage a 
war for 1000 years, a war of defense… I am not referring here to 
some of the remarks made by countries which have no right to be 
here—they are not even countries… (Bhutto 1-5)  
 
Emotional nuance is individualized marketing: phrases, gestures and body 
language that piques targeted individuals in a certain way. Floyd Henry Allport, 
the father of social psychology, describes emotional nuance “as an attitude to feel 
and react in a highly specific fashion towards another human being” (96). Using 
emotional nuance shows a deep understanding of the audience, message and 
purpose because it is tailored to each individual. The audience may feel that the 
speaker is addressing them individually. It is interesting to see how and why 
Bhutto used emotional nuance. His words reflected the ambivalent relationship 
between India and Pakistan from the Pakistani viewpoint. Hussain Haqqani writes 
that both countries needed peace before they could progress but, Bhutto like most 
Pakistanis particularly felt “that India had not truly recognized partition…”(97). 
There are two significant example of emotional nuance before the 
December 15 statement. The first was at Tashkent, where Bhutto showed his 
dissatisfaction with the Tashkent Pact by his sullen body language, sulking and 
later by paranoid, repetitive references (Junejo 51; Gilani 221; Raza 213). In 
disrespecting Ayub Khan, a Pakistani  military dictator and his political godfather, 
Bhutto showed he was not only against the Pact and the hurried peace with India, 
but also against Khan and the establishment he represented. The message sent 
forth was that he “sanctioned” the Pact because of Khan’s presence. The second 
example was the statement delivered on 14 December, 1971. Amongst his 
scholarly arguments on alleviation of poverty and global peace, he used Punjabi 
phrases to address Swaran Singh, the Indian foreign minister, who spoke English 
in a strong Punjabi accent. In a show of undiplomatic behavior and emotional 
nuance, Bhutto mimicked him several times in private sessions at Pakistan’s 
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foreign ministry (Taseer 46). The clash of scholarly and the theatrical discourse is 
highlighted in 14 December statement. which uses Punjabi phrases in the end:  
From the outset I am quite prepared to accept that we have made 
mistakes…We are prepared to rectify those mistakes in a civilized 
spirit… And if the world does not seize the problem, if the world 
does not have the courage and moral fiber to say that these issues 
must be resolved…And who will suffer? The poor people of India 
and Pakistan will suffer- and I am a friend of not only the poor 
people of Pakistan: I am a friend of the poor people of India also. 
We have more poverty than any other people in the world…   Like 
Alice, we have come to Wonderland to tell you that our country 
and our subcontinent is turning into a wasteland… Sonar Bangla, 
Sardar Sahib eta Ama der Sonar Bangla, Bharater nai: listen, 
Sardar Swaran Singh, the golden Bengal belongs to Pakistan, not 
to India, Golden Bengal belongs to Pakistan. You cannot take 
away golden Bengal like that from Pakistan. We will fight to the 
bitter end … (Bhutto 9-38) [emphasis added] 
 The Punjabi language is known for its coarse and earthy appeal and this 
usage brought a village brawl quality to the Security Council. Bhutto may have 
implied that he expected the listener, a person of a Punjabi heritage, to share the 
attributes of his language. He had talked about a thousand year war during the 
campaign and in the UN after ’65. However taking it to the Security Council in 
the given circumstances seems foolhardy for a man of Bhutto’s intellect. Why 
did he do it?  Though scholars have tried to delve into Bhutto’s complex 
psychology to assess his confrontational stance, we will look at rhetorical 
reasons. Bhutto realized that Pakistanis would be listening and tried to address 
them while talking to the Council. In essence, Bhutto spoke to “two” audiences 
simultaneously and varied his discourse accordingly.  
Scholars have discussed Bhutto’s understanding of audience, message and 
purpose in campaign discourse. All say he expertly played up to his audience’s 
expectations. He knew how to cajole his audience and used emotional nuances 
to communicate with them at several levels. Syed writes that Bhutto’s discourse 
was his legacy and that his conduct was a mirror in which Pakistanis could 
view themselves (253-259). Syed Zulfiqar Gilani writes that his discourse 
cultivated his audience’s need for identity and a redeemer or messiah (232). He 
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thrived on confrontation and assimilated the personal and political (228-229). 
Akmal Hussain writes that Bhutto cultivated his charisma and encouraged 
audience participation through rhetorical questions and rhythm. During delivery 
he sought to look and behave like his audience; he unbuttoned his collar, 
shirtsleeves and assumed the disheveled appearance of his audience (136). His 
critics call him a demagogue. Khalid Bin Sayeed says Bhutto entertained his 
audiences with mimicry and dramatics and was mostly an actor (51). Golam 
Waheed Chaudhary argues that he could only influence illiterate voters (236). 
Lawrence Ziring argues that Bhutto happened to be at the right place at the right 
time in a third world country where the political culture guaranteed the rise of 
single leader (582). However the extraordinary conditions in which Bhutto 
created this statement need to be assessed.  
The 15 December Statement  
This statement was made in extraordinary conditions because of 
Pakistan’s position and Bhutto’s own status. Pakistan was not only on the 
losing side but it was poised to lose half of its territory. There was virtually no 
historical precedent for this situation. Countries were disembodied after world 
wars: Ottoman Empire in 1921 and Germany in 1945.Pakistan would face 
dismemberment similar to that experienced by the Ottoman Empire and 
Germany and would be divided into smaller countries. Territorial 
dismemberment would accompany military surrender and national humiliation. 
The war was too short, the enemy too weak, and the Pakistani Army too 
entrenched in bloodletting to elicit international sympathy for surrender. 
Pakistan would suffer the disgrace of the biggest surrender in military history 
and 93,000 men would lay down their arms. The war meant the end of united 
Pakistan. There was also the problem of breaking such news to a deeply 
emotional public that had believed in the invincibility of its armed forces and in 
the superiority of its culture. Pakistani nationalism stressed cultural superiority 
over Bengalis and religious superiority over Hindus (Ahmed). Hussain Haqqani 
says Pakistani generals exaggerated the military strength of their soldiers and 
said that Muslims had the fighting prowess of five Hindus”( 87). These 
conditions worsened the complicated rhetorical situation. There was also the 
problem of Bhutto’s status. Unlike Swaran Singh, his Indian counterpart,  
Bhutto had the most to gain politically from the break up of the country as a 
leader. Unlike Singh, Bhutto was both diplomat and leader and both roles were 
in direct conflict. Pakistan’s loss was his gain. Haqqani argues that Bhutto’s trip 
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to the UN was arranged by the Army to put a civilian façade on a military 
debacle. The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) realized that schism was 
inevitable and they would need a charismatic, civilian scapegoat to blame for 
the break up of Pakistan (88- 91). Bhutto was a deputy prime minister from a 
martial law regime that itself lacked legitimacy. Ironically he had no fiat and 
had been almost recalled on his way to New York (Raza 122). There was also 
the problem of weak ethos.  Internationally Bhutto was viewed as brash and 
fiery (Raza 237; Pace). While at home despite his immense popularity, he was 
perceived as a maverick and was criticized for his boycott of the Assembly.  
The direct audience for the statement was clearly hostile. This audience 
was comprised of members of the Security Council, elite press and the 
international community. The reports of mass killings, millions of refugees, and 
Indian rhetoric had transformed the conflict from an internal issue to a global 
conflict where superpowers picked sides in glaring view of the international 
press (La Porte 103). The indirect audience was the people of West Pakistan for 
whom the primary message was that East Pakistan was lost. Giving this 
audience the bad news was tricky as the state-controlled media and press had 
reported glorious victories until the day of the statement. For the East Pakistanis 
the message was that Bhutto accepted the mistakes made by the army and they 
could consider him a sympathetic leader. He tried to salvage national pride by 
shifting attention from the institutional to the individual.  
Structure of the Statement 
The statement itself was 4678 words long and divided into 26 paragraphs 
and 288 sentences. His greatest challenge in communicating with a disparate, vast 
audience. Bhutto used short sentences to simplify the message, and his balanced 
and varied diction used both formal language and colloquialism to reach his vast, 
multilingual and global audience. Yet his formal, highly stylized language is also 
laced with diplomatic jargon quite expected in the Council. Speakers from former 
colonies have to focus strongly on their diction or risk coming across as deficient, 
semi-literate or pedantic but Bhutto with his Oxford education faced no such 
challenge. And having been in the UN since 1957, he knew the demands of the 
register, genre and the importance of tone (Junejo 33). As he began, he reminded 
the Council that “a grave moment in his country’s history” gave him the right to 
speak: 
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We have met here today at a grave moment in the history of my 
country and I would request the Council kindly to bear with me 
and to hear the truth, the bitter truth. The time has come when, as 
far as Pakistan is concerned, we shall have to speak the truth 
whether members of the Council like it or not…We were hoping 
that the Security Council, mindful of its responsibilities for the 
maintenance of world peace and justice, would act according to 
principles and bring an end to a naked, brutal aggression against 
my people… I felt that it was imperative for me to come here and 
seek justice from the Security Council. But I must say, whether the 
members like it or not, that the Security Council has denied my 
country that justice. (Bhutto 39) 
Bhutto began the statement in active voice, “We have met here  at a grave 
moment..” which makes brisk, compelling prose and balances the use of abstract 
terms such as, “grave moment”, “bitter truth”, “brutal aggression”. Abstract terms 
show emotion and ideals but not doers of actions and are effective in creating 
pathos. The use of strong adjectives,“brutal”, “grave”, “bitter” have strong 
emotional overtones and immediately set a sanctimonious tone. It is up to Bhutto, 
the representative of  a small country, to remind the UN of its responsibilities. He 
drew attention away from the responsibilities of Pakistani soldiers towards the 
responsibilities of the UN delegates. He discussed the principled stance of 
Pakistan as an independent country facing troubles created by a powerful 
neighbor. He referred to the history of the Indo-Pakistan conflict and prospects for 
peace. This was a good rhetorical choice as it was based on logos. Formal 
language is enhanced by nominalizations. Nominalizations give any speech a 
formal, slow style. Bhutto’s nominalizations included: “dilatory tactics” (Bhutto 
39), “legalization of aggression” (Bhutto 40), “imprisonment” (Bhutto 48). He 
balanced the formal language with colloquialism, which allowed laymen, press 
and common people to understand a complicated geopolitical situation in which 
three countries, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, claimed to be victims:  
Let us face the stark truth. I have got no stakes left for the moment 
(Bhutto 40)  
Well, you will be sunk (Bhutto 43) 
We will not lick the dust. (Bhutto 46) 
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The rhetorical effect of colloquialism or everyday language is to simplify the 
message into something informal, casual which even the general public could 
understand. Colloquialism makes an abstract idea concrete.  
Bhutto established the ethos, his authority, by referring to his career as a 
diplomat, his experience in the Council and also his own reputation as a noted 
orator. He quoted statesmen like Woodrow Wilson and Thomas Jefferson to 
identify with his audience. He used these references to frame himself not as a 
trouble-maker or demagogue but to show his audience, that though he was not 
from the western world he was an erudite, well-read man like them in thinking 
and education. They could trust him to tell the truth. In the opening that criticized 
the Security Council and India, Bhutto described Pakistan as a country wronged 
by its powerful neighbor, isolated by its allies and neglected by its former colonial 
masters, and so was forced to speak unpleasant truths and use harsh language 
because of the severity of the situation. Blistering criticism was tempered by few 
conciliatory words. He was most critical of the United Nations:  
The Security Council has failed miserably, shamefully... President 
Woodrow Wilson said that he fought the First World War to end 
wars for all time. The League of Nations came into being and then 
the United Nations after it. What has the United Nations done? I 
know of the farce and the fraud of the United Nations. (Bhutto 40) 
Bhutto used diction cleverly here by using related terms with emotional 
connotation: “Wilson”, “League of Nation” and “First World War”. These terms 
work together to impart a sense of impotence and feebleness because of their 
associative history. Then the use of emotional terms “shamefully”, “fraud”, 
“farce” further enhance this connotation. The idea generated is that UN is 
following in the footsteps of the League. Given the paucity of time, his tone was 
harsh and sanctimonious from the opening and, throughout the statement he 
would vary the level of emotional nuance and create theatrical discourse. As in 
deliberative oratory, he used by-words to exhort his listeners: justice (16 times), 
world peace (4 times), truth (7 times), Pakistan (53 times). He appealed to the 
higher aspirations of the Council as a global community. This conflict was an 
opportunity to exercise the principles of justice and truth which were the 
ideological foundations of the UN. Neglecting the issue would mean damaging its 
ideological foundations. 
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The statement also uses several imperative sentences, which convey a 
power differential by giving orders or commands.  The word “must” is often used 
and implies that the speaker is somehow in the position to give such commands; 
this was an extraordinary choice given the rhetorical conditions.  
I have some home truths to tell the Security Council. The world 
must know. My people must know. (Bhutto 40) 
I go back to the Roman Empire and I say what Cato said to the 
Romans, "Carthage must be destroyed." (Bhutto 42) 
 He was a representative of a small country on the brink of extinction and his own 
position as deputy prime minister was shaky. Yet he gave advice and orders as if 
he were truly in power; this created his image of a global wadera. Even the plain 
declarative sentences sound defiant because of the use of action verbs such as 
must, will, do not: 
Do not come back with a document of surrender. (Bhutto 40)  
You will be turning the medium sized and small countries into the 
harlots of the world. You cannot do that. (Bhutto 45)  
Declarative sentences make statements and give information about some noun or 
verb. Bhutto created an image of power despite with strong verbs such as “do not” 
and “cannot do”.  
Most interesting is the use of abstract terms to refer to terms with negative 
connotation. These were negative terms such as the Pakistani Army, refugees and 
massacres which could not have not been mentioned in the Council without 
censure and would have weakened Pakistan’s stance . Abstract terms refer to 
ideals and are open to interpretation. He used the abstract terms to gloss over the 
actions of the Pakistani army who were responsible for the massacres and the 
refugee problem:  
We have been subjected to attack by a militarily powerful 
neighbour. Who says that the new reality arose out of free will? 
(Bhutto 43)  
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If the Security Council wants me to be a party to the legalization 
of abject surrender, then I say that under no circumstances shall I 
be. (Bhutto 40)  
He used the passive voice to shift blame and to prevent mentioning the Pakistan 
army. The passive voice is always used in shifting blame and is an excellent way 
of breaking bad news as it hides the subject or the doer of action. It was useful to 
protect the Army from censure. Bhutto only mentioned the Pakistani soldiers 
once, in a quotation from British general who praised their valor. He mentioned 
the Pakistan army indirectly by referring to “the refugee problem” and called the 
“the massacres” “mistakes”: 
The refugee problem was used as a pretext, an ugly, crude pretext, 
a shameful pretext to invade my country, to invade East Pakistan. 
(Bhutto 44)  
Unfortunately, nothing was said of the massacres that took place 
between 1 March and 25 March. No doubt there were mistakes on 
our side. (Bhutto 44)  
Bhutto understood that the involvement of several protagonists such as 
refugees, insurgents, two armies, the UN, Indians and the superpowers made the 
situation difficult to comprehend. He chose to explain the complicated situation 
by short sentences, which add energy to any speech (Corbett 465).  Average 
sentence length in this discourse is 16 words3. Short sentences are easier to 
understand in speech and shows that Bhutto kept in mind the diverse, global 
listening audience while composing the statement. He also used short sentences to 
frame analogy and provide varied historical references as he perceived that other 
countries viewed the dismemberment as a war of liberation. Here are some 
examples of short sentences used in the statement: 
Why can Texas not be free? Let there be a republic of Texas. 
(Bhutto 46) 
Since the Opium War, China has seen reality. The reality for 
France was that it was under occupation. (Bhutto 42) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Corbett	  and	  Connor	  say	  average sentence length is calculated by dividing the 
total number of words by the number of sentences (361).	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Ethiopia was under Fascist domination. But the Ethiopians 
fought… Ethiopia is free today. (Bhutto 42) 
He also used short sentences to state his central argument. The central argument 
was laid out in syllogism, a logical appeal, and stated: All countries have 
problems and make mistakes but they are not dismembered. Pakistan has a 
problem and has made a mistake. Therefore Pakistan should not be dismembered.  
Which Government does not make mistakes? But if some 
government has made a mistake, does it follow that the country 
itself must be dismembered, obliterated? Is that going to be the 
conclusion of the Security Council if it legalized Indian aggression 
on the soil of Pakistan? (Bhutto 44) 
The syllogism simplified the complex event into a two-line argument that would 
have been easy for even a layman to understand. It also formed a logical appeal 
that would have piqued the self-interest of smaller countries with separatist 
groups. It also showed the listening audience that Pakistan was aware of its 
responsibility in the tragedy. For the Pakistani listeners the implied argument was 
that international powers contributed to the dismemberment.  
The short sentences are placed in paragraphs of varying length. Paragraphs 
show progression of related ideas on a topic and are usually denoted in speech as 
pauses.  Bhutto used 26 paragraphs in the official version which were both long 
and short since there were several related topics. The statement’s structural 
strength is revealed in the paragraphing: he used each paragraph to discuss a 
different aspect. For instance Bhutto used paragraph 2 and 3 to describe the delays 
by the Council, paragraph 17 to defend the American stance. There are some 
transitional paragraphs such as 14 and 16 that discuss ideas of world stability and 
primarily addressed to the Council. There are some capsule or short paragraphs 
12, 21 that show that Bhutto was trying to cover a lot of ground in a short time: 
East Pakistan is an integral part of Pakistan. Kashmir is a disputed 
territory. Why does India then not permit it to exercise its will? 
(Bhutto 44)(Par.12) 
Muslim Bengal was a part of Pakistan of its free will, not through 
money. We did not buy it as Alaska was purchased. Why do the 
people of the United States not see that? (Bhutto 44)(Par. 21) 
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Pronominal references have been used creatively in the statement. The use 
of second person pronoun “you” made it seem that Bhutto was addressing the 
listener directly. This gave the entire statement the impact of face-to-face 
conversation—inclusive and personable—despite being delivered to a larger 
audience:  
You do not need a Secretary General. You need a chief executioner. 
(Bhutto 40)  
But the Indians are so short-sighted… But you know they do not 
have vision. (Bhutto 41) 
So you will see now: this is not the end of the road; this is the 
beginning of the road… (Bhutto 44) 
An interesting finding is the glaring overuse of first- person, singular pronoun. 
Bhutto referred to himself about 88 times in the statement: he “spoke from the 
heart”, spoke about his son, his reputation as speaker and his victory in the polls, 
which was “greater than Mujib ur Rehman’s.” It is difficult to separate the 
political from the personal in some paragraphs: 
I told the United States Ambassador in Pakistan that once a civilian 
government came into being in Pakistan, I was prepared to go to 
the refugee camps myself to talk to them. But they pre-empted it all 
because the refugee problem was used as a pretext to dismember 
my country. (Bhutto 44) (Emphasis added) 
Finally, I am not a rat. I have never ratted in my life. I have faced 
assassination attempts, I have faced imprisonments. I have always 
confronted crises. Today I am not ratting, but I am leaving your 
Security Council. I find it disgraceful to my person and to my 
country to remain here a moment longer than is necessary. I am not 
boycotting… (Bhutto 47-48) (Emphasis added) 
Seeing Bhutto’s tremendous eruditeness these statements were a deliberate 
choice and really tested the limits of diplomatic discourse and truth. Why did he 
do it? Though it makes for egocentric prose it achieved an important rhetorical 
goal; the focus of the statement shifted from Pakistan to Bhutto. The man was 
more visible than his country. This may have seemed to him a good way of 
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deflecting attention from the terrible humiliation that lay ahead for Pakistan and 
politically it was advantageous because it showed him as a strong leader who 
understood his nation. 
 3. Stylistic Features and Their Rhetorical Effects  
Though there are several stylistic features used in the statement I will 
focus on those that are intimately connected to audience, purpose and message.  
Bhutto used emotional nuance through rhetorical question and irony, fulfilled 
purpose through metaphors and metonymy, and stressed the message through 
anaphora and epistrophe. 
There is a discernable pattern of rhetorical questions followed by historical 
reference. The rhetorical question is used to invoke audience participation and 
make them feel that the speaker shares their values. It was Bhutto’s signature style 
in campaign speeches, where he used it to assume a defiant posture. Here he used 
it to create doubts in the listener’s mind regarding India: 
How is he [the Indian Foreign Minister] distinguished when his 
hands are full of blood, when his heart is full of venom? (Bhutto 
41) 
What hope will India give to the people of East Pakistan? What 
picture of hope is it going to give when its own people in Western 
Bengal sleep in the streets, where there is terrible poverty, where 
there is terrible injustice and exploitation, when the parliamentary 
rule in West Bengal has been superseded by presidential rule? 
(Bhutto 46) 
Rhetorical questions induce the listeners to make an appropriate response and are 
good devices to keep the audience rhetorically engaged. Here Bhutto used 
contrasting elements: hope and injustice, presidential rule and parliamentary rule 
to augment his broader argument of justice and injustice. 
Bhutto used apposition exquisitely as irony (emotional nuance) in the 
statement. Apposition places two coordinate elements side-by-side: the second 
coordinate explains the first. He used apposition to confront the Indian and 
Russian representatives and represent them as figures of ridicule: 
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If he can be Foreign Minister of India, I could have been Prime 
Minister of united India. But I would rather be a janitor in a free 
country. (Bhutto 41) 
I know you are the representative of a great country, you behave 
like one. The way you throw out your chest, the way you thump 
the table. You don’t talk like Comrade Malik, you talk like Tsar 
Malik. (Bhutto 45) 
I don’t see what objection he has to it if he sees some similarity 
between his [Russian] empire and the Roman Empire. (Bhutto 42) 
These ironical references are rude, sarcastic and an extreme example of emotional 
nuance that flout all rules of diplomatic discourse. Irony shows Bhutto’s true 
understanding of elite press (audience) who are more likely to remember and 
report hyperbolic phrases rather than any clichés. The ironical references also 
depict contrasting elements or analogies through rhetorical wordplay: “Foreign 
Minister”, “Prime Minister”; “Czar Malik”, “Comrade Malik”. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to analyze why Bhutto said this, but one reason may be that 
Bhutto decided to live up to his reputation as a fiery speaker by indulging in 
hyperbole and emotional nuance. In some ways he spoke to these individuals as 
he spoke to political opponents.  
He fulfilled purpose through metaphors and metonymy. Metaphors are 
analogies or comparisons between two similar objects and ideas and express value 
judgment. Metaphors fulfill the audience’s need for simplification (Corbett and 
Connors 479). Bhutto’s metaphors include: 
My heart is bleeding. (Bhutto 45) 
You will be turning the medium-sized and the small countries into the 
harlots of the world. (Bhutto 45) 
We are your guinea pigs. (Bhutto 46) 
Finally I am not a rat. (Bhutto 47) 
They seem like survival metaphors as both guinea pigs and rats are hunted down 
or used in experimentation. Comparing small countries to harlots drew attention 
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to the precarious situation of weaker countries in a bipolar world. Survival 
metaphors served to remind smaller countries of the current static hierarchy and 
power differential. They also helped to repeat the message in a subliminal 
manner. Bhutto used metonymy for brevity. Metonymy substitutes some attribute 
or suggestive word for what is actually meant and it is useful for rhetorical 
wordplay. He summed up the past, present and the future of Indo-Pak relations in 
a word: Carthage (Bhutto 42), an allusion with a powerful, succinct affect that 
may have affected the audience because of his well-known hawkish agenda. The 
connotations of Carthage are infinite, continuous wars until the complete 
destruction of the enemy.  
Bhutto stressed the message through epistrophe and anaphora.These 
stylistic devices are useful for repetition. Epistrophe is the repetition of the same 
word or phrases at the end of each successive clause or sentence. Bhutto’s 
epistrophes include: 
China was under foreign occupation for years. Other countries 
have been under foreign occupation. France was under foreign 
occupation. Western Europe was under foreign occupation. 
(Bhutto 41) (Emphasis added) 
But you know they do not have vision. The partition of India in 
1947 took place because they did not have vision. Now also they 
are lacking vision. They talk about their ancient civilization and 
the mystique of India and all that. But they do not have vision at 
all. (Bhutto 41) (Emphasis added) 
Epistrope is effective and resonant as a memory aid because it repeats terms and 
allows listeners to remember some of the speech. Had Bhutto said, “France, China 
and Western Europe were under foreign occupation” it would have been effective 
but dull. Epistrophe enlivens prose and makes it memorable. 
Anaphora is the repetition of the same word or phrases at the beginning of 
each successive clause or sentence. Here are some examples of anaphora from the 
statement: 
Let us build a monument to the veto, a big monument to the veto. 
Let us build a monument to the impotence and incapacity of the 
Security Council and the General Assembly. (Bhutto 41) 
47
Syeda Sara Abbas 	  
	  
You have to be either on the side of justice or on the side of 
injustice; you are either on the side of the aggressor or of the 
victim. There is no third road. It is a black and white situation in 
these matters; there is no grey involved. You are either for right or 
you are for wrong; you are either for justice or for injustice… 
(Bhutto 47)  
 Anaphora gives a ringing tone to any paragraph and in the first example it 
accompanies a hortative sentence type, “Let us…”  which gives it a sanctimonius, 
bitter aspect. Again Bhutto is reminding the Council of its duties. These devices 
are used for emphasis and rhythm as they are repetitive and resonate longer in 
memory. These also show the arrangement of words in increasing importance and 
add a sense of climax. Bhutto used the terms “right/ wrong” and then followed it 
with stronger terms “justice/injustice”,  which are much more appealing terms for 
a global community. Rhythm piques listeners’ expectations and is used to 
embellish oral and written texts. This attention to sentence arrangement brings 
desired ideas into focus and also shows the arrangement of words in increasing 
importance. However both stylistic devices working together in one sentence may 
not have the desired effect. 
So what if the whole of East Pakistan falls? So what if the whole of 
West Pakistan falls? So what if our state is obliterated? We will 
build a new Pakistan. We will build a better Pakistan. We will 
build a greater Pakistan. (Bhutto 41) 
 As the paragraph progresses the listeners’ attention is focused on the subject of 
the sentence “We will,” which is repeated through anaphora and depicts resolve 
and determination. However with the use of epistrophe the listener’s attention 
shifts from the subject phrase “We will” to the predicate phrase “build a new 
Pakistan.” The change in focus from the doer, “We” to the object “a new 
Pakistan” is somewhat jarring. This is an example of overuse of stylistic 
technique. The paragraph becomes somewhat too rhetorical and the effect is 
bombastic and hollow. The use of hyperbole is overdone and complex in this 
instance.  
In conclusion, the statement is a vivid, electrifying discourse that appeals 
to pathos and varies between a caveat and narrative. Barring a few stylistic flaws, 
the use of concrete terms and active voice make the statement inspiring. There is 
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flowing prose and strong rhythm throughout the statement. There is a coherent 
argument sustained through syllogism, contrasting elements and historical 
analogies.  
5. Conclusion 
Near death experiences of nations are difficult to communicate. The 
choice of the announcement of the surrender was crucial as Pakistanis were 
expecting victory. As an elected leader Bhutto chose to let the army announce the 
surrender. He established his legitimacy as the leader by distancing himself from 
the military junta by evoking key phrases and promoted himself more than his 
cause. His theatrical discourse may have been seen as an affront to the Council by 
the international community who disregarded his  emotional appeals. Ironically 
the fall of Dhaka the next day ended the deliberation. 
Bhutto’s rhetorical aims with the direct audience had a shock value: 
though the Security Council went back to procedural matters, the elite press 
played up to his expectations by vivid reporting of the statement. His theatrics 
gained as much attention as the Fall of Dhaka. The New York Times reported that 
as Bhutto walked out, members of the Council looked on expressionlessly and 
after a moment of silence the President Ismael. B Taylor gave the floor to a 
Tunisian delegate and the Council droned on. The Washington Times called it 
“living theatre”. The British press was quite critical of Pakistan.:The Sunday 
Telegraph said Britain should have supported India instead of remaining neutral, 
which was ironically one of Bhutto’s minor points. The Daily Mirror blamed 
Pakistan for the war, saying it had forced West Asia to the point of war (Nagendra 
Kr Singh, Vol 2). 
 Pakistan’s daily Dawn ignored the fall of Dhaka the next day and chose to 
focus on Bhutto. It reported matter-of-factly on December 16, “UN a farce, says 
Bhutto- walks out” (Bangladesh Genocide Archives). 
Bhutto was more successful with his indirect audience, the Pakistanis. 
Though theatrical, deeply personal and hyperbolic, the statement served their 
emotional needs. He told them what they wanted to hear, which was that Pakistan 
would survive. They wanted to blame someone; India, Russia or an international 
conspiracy for the near death experience. His statement told the world that 
Pakistan possessed organic, popular, and forceful leadership that was as 
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anomalous as the nation. The Pakistani press played up the theatrical, florid side 
of the statement and Bhutto came to power in a burst of popularity.  
In some ways Bhutto may have been too successful in his rhetorical aims 
with the Pakistani audience, since he may have deflected attention away from the 
true events behind Fall of Dhaka that later it became difficult for Pakistanis to 
believe in the genocide unleashed by the Pakistani army. The genocide was 
remembered euphemistically as military action, the suffering of war refugees was 
eclipsed by the capture of prisoners of war. Later scholarship such as Ziring and 
Choudhury minutely analyzed Bhutto’s role and rhetoric in the breaking up of 
Pakistan and disregarded the role of Pakistan Army in affecting Bhutto’s 
discourse. This needs further study.  
 Bhutto projected himself as a human microcosm of the country. At that 
moment in the Security Council he was Pakistan with all its rage, prejudices and 
complexities. No Pakistani leader would have dared used such rhetoric against the 
superpowers on their own turf. It is also doubtful that any other discourse would 
have satisfied the Pakistani people in their darkest hour.  
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